You will be provided with a reference and some statements. Please determine whether each statement is 'supported', 'unsupported', or 'unknown' with respect to the reference. Please note:
First, assess whether the reference contains any valid content. If the reference contains no valid information, such as a 'page not found' message, then all statements should be considered 'unknown'.
If the reference is valid, for a given statement: if the facts or data it contains can be found entirely or partially within the reference, it is considered 'supported' (data accepts rounding); if all facts and data in the statement cannot be found in the reference, it is considered 'unsupported'.

You should return the result in a JSON list format, where each item in the list contains the statement's index and the judgment result, for example:
[
    {
        "idx": 1,
        "result": "supported"
    },
    {
        "idx": 2,
        "result": "unsupported"
    }
]

Below are the reference and statements:
<reference>
OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION

ODI RESUME
U.S. Department
of Transportation
National Highway
Traffic Safety
Administration

Investigation: EA22002
Prompted By: PE21020
Date Opened: 06/08/2022
Date Closed: 04/25/2024
Investigator: Steven Posada
Reviewer:
Gregory Magno
Approver:
Tanya Topka
Subject:
Autopilot System Driver Controls

MANUFACTURER & PRODUCT INFORMATION
Manufacturer:
Products:
Population:

Tesla, Inc.
2012 – 2023 Model Y, X, S, 3 equipped w/ Autopilot manufactured up to 7-Dec2023
2,031,220

Problem Description: The prominence and scope of Autopilot’s control may be insufficient to prevent
crashes due to lack of driver engagement.

FAILURE REPORT SUMMARY
ODI

Manufacturer

EWR D&I

Other

Total

EWR Field Reports

All Incidents:

12

259

10

421

467*

0

Crashes/Fires:

12

259

10

421

467*

0

Injury Incidents:

1

31

7

27

32*

0

Number of Injuries:

1

53

12

41

54*

0

Fatality Incidents:

2

11

3

9

13*

0

Number of Fatalities:

2

12

3

9

14*

0

Description of Other: Crashes reported to the Standing General Order (SGO) or media reports. All 12 VOQs
listed under the ODI category were verified to have Autopilot engaged.
*Total eliminates duplicates received by the manufacturer

ACTION/SUMMARY INFORMATION
Action:

The Engineering Analysis (EA) has been closed.

Summary:
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work
and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform
vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral

Investigation: EA22002

Close Resume Page 1 of 3

safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected
additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and
related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and
hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of
related publications dedicated to partial driving automation.
Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and
Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed
but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front.
As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep
the vehicle in its driving lane.
Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that
provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment
under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor
the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the
dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver
engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and
driver expectations.
ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of
those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle
was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of
the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal
plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to
avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteer was inadvertently disengaged by the
driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI
observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment
showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same
time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its
higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control
authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the
driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low
traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations. Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash
analysis is available in the EA22002 file.
ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12,
2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced
and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system,
stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,
and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion.
ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s
weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This
mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating
capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes.
During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving
serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis
Investigation: EA22002

Close Resume Page 2 of 3

conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report,
indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver
assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver.
Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse,
ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess
the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy.
To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to
NHTSA.gov.

Investigation: EA22002

Close Resume Page 3 of 3
</reference>

<statements>
1. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International standard J3016 establishes the primary technical and taxonomy baseline referenced by automotive engineers, federal regulators, and state legislatures
2. Standard J3016 partitions vehicular automation into six discrete tiers, delineated by how the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) and the DDT fallback are distributed between the human operator and the automated driving system
3. However, SAE Level 2 architecture delegates OEDR supervision and DDT fallback entirely to the human driver
4. If the vehicle lacks an active closed-loop driver monitoring system capable of measuring eye gaze, the driver remains unaware of the impending collision until impact is unavoidable
5. However, this legal posture relies on an empirical assumption that human-factors research has consistently challenged: it expects an operator to maintain continuous mental vigilance over a repetitive, machine-executed task
6. The interaction between ADAS design and operator disengagement was formally documented in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) Engineering Analysis EA22-002, which concluded in April 2024
7. As a key operational factor in the Yaw Loss of Control category of EA22-002, the system operated in low-traction environments such as wet pavement and ice outside manufacturer recommendations
8. NHTSA concluded that the system suffered from a design defect: its driver-engagement monitoring was inadequate for the system's operational design domain and permissive capabilities
9. By permitting automated operation on roadways with cross-traffic and intersections without direct gaze verification, the system fostered automation complacency and created a critical safety gap that led to foreseeable driver misuse
</statements>

Begin the assessment now. Output only the JSON list, without any conversational text or explanations.