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A moderated mediation model: the role of Need for Cognitive
Closure in the relation between System Justification
and Conspiracy Beliefs
Work published in open access form
and licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution – NonCommercial
ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
© Author (s)
E-ISSN 2724-2943
ISSN 2723-973X

Mariateresa Loverrea, Matteo Bonoraa*, Stefano Livia, Fabio Lucidia,
and Andrea Chiricoa
Department of Psychology of Developmental and Socialization Processes, “Sapienza”
University of Rome, Rome, Italy
a

Psychology Hub (2025)
XLII, 3, 27-34

Article info
__________________________________________________________________

Submitted: 28 January 2025
Accepted: 22 September 2025
DOI: 10.13133/2724-2943/18804

Abstract
Need for Cognitive Closure can be defined as a personal preference for predictability and
intolerance towards uncertainty. The connection between Need for Cognitive Closure
and conspiracy beliefs is evident: conspiracy theories offer simple and conclusive solutions
to complex issues, providing explanations for events that do not have clear dynamics.
Features of conspiracy theories make them attractive to people high in Need for Cognitive
Closure. There are personal characteristics that increase the likelihood of conspiracy theories’
endorsement. The present study (N = 138) tested a moderated mediation model, using
variance-based structural equation modeling, highlighting the role of Need for Cognitive
Closure as a moderator in the relationship between System Justification and General
Conspiracy Beliefs, which resulted as a mediator in the relationship between System
Justification and Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention. We observed the moderation effect
of Need for Cognitive Closure in the relationship between General Conspiracy Beliefs and
Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention. Finally, conspiracy priming showed a strong effect
on Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention compared to anti-conspiracy priming and the
combination of the two kinds of priming. Results clarify complex dynamics that directly
or indirectly foster the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Practical implications regard
preventing conspiracy theories’ deleterious effects. Interventions focused on educating people
before their exposure to conspiracy theories could provide an attempt to protect people
against these theories by warning them about manipulative dynamics to which they will
be subjected.
Keywords: Conspiracy Theory; Conspiracy Beliefs; Need for Cognitive Closure; System
Justification

*Corresponding author.
Matteo Bonora
Department of Psychology of
Developmental and Socialization
Processes, “Sapienza” University
of Rome, Rome, Italy
E-mail: matteo.bonora@uniroma1.it
(M. Bonora)

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Mariateres Loverrea, Matteo Bonora, Stefano Livi, Fabio Lucidi, and Andrea Chirico

Introduction
Conspiracy theories can be considered a peculiar case of
misinformation (Swami et al., 2014). In The Washington
Monthly (1975), Bethell first advanced the hypothesis that
conspiracy explanations of Kennedy’s assassination were
widespread because an explanation that involved a lone
assassin was not satisfactory enough for such an important
event. According to this hypothesis, the studies conducted by
McCauley & Jacques (1979) demonstrated the popularity of
conspiracy theories due to the irrational need to explain big
and important events with proportionately big and important
causes. Scholars concur that conspiracy theories explain the
causes of significant events such as secret actions of malevolent
groups (Uscinski & Paret, 2014; Wood et al., 2012). Studies
show that these theories modify people’s attitudes on important
issues (Douglas & Sutton, 2018; Jolley et al., 2020; Jolley &
Douglas, 2014), like political matters. An international trend
sees a general increase in the use of conspiracy theories in
political affairs (Moore, 2016). Conspiracy theories are helpful
in reallocating power between different political characters;
for this reason, they can be considered “populist theories of
power” (Fenster, 1999): conspiracy theories propose simplistic
and dangerous visions, fostering populist interpretations.
A pilot study by Jolley et al. (2017) identified a positive
association between conspiracy beliefs and system justification.
Considering, notwithstanding subsequent findings by the same
study demonstrating that conspiracy beliefs predict system
justification, the present study investigates the alternative
and original hypothesis that system-justifying beliefs may
also facilitate the endorsement of conspiracy theories, thereby
acknowledging the complex and potentially bidirectional
nature of this relationship. The relationship between the two
constructs derives from the idea that individuals who endorse
system-justifying beliefs are motivated to maintain a positive
perception of the existing social order. In the face of injustices
or societal crises, these individuals may adopt conspiracy
theories, attributing blame to deviant groups or external actors.
This allows them to avoid cognitive dissonance and defend
the system’s legitimacy, which they continue to perceive as
fundamentally fair and just. On another note, when people
consider the actual societal system as just and righteous, their
adherence to conspiracy beliefs lowers (Pellegrini et al., 2024).
Other scholars have investigated belief consistency as a
mechanism underlying conspiracy thinking, highlighting
the tendency to endorse one conspiracy theory to predict
belief in others, even when they appear unrelated (Douglas
& Sutton, 2008; Swami et al., 2011). Accordingly,
individuals endorsing concrete and specific theories tied to
particular events or topics are considerably more inclined
to adopt broader general conspiratorial beliefs, reflecting
a pervasive distrust across diverse public interest domains
(Wood, 2017). Wood et al. (2012) demonstrated that the
aforementioned mechanism works even if conspiracy theories
are inconsistent with each other or irrelevant, finding that
the more participants believed that Princess Diana faked
her own death, the more they believed that she was killed
because both ideas were consistent with the assumption that
something was being covered up.

The spread of conspiracy theories is also related to the
satisfaction of curiosity when information is inadequate, when
available data are conflicting, or when events seem random
(Douglas et al., 2017). Conspiracy thinking is a mindset
regarding people looking for simple explanations, so this
perspective is attractive to people intolerant of uncertainty
(Marchlewska et al., 2018): the aversion toward ambiguity is
a dynamic related to the Need for Cognitive Closure (NfCC;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This construct relates to the
inclination toward predictability and preference for structure.
Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) showed that people with a
low tolerance for ambiguity tended to prefer the simplified
explanations related to conspiracy theories over the multiple
explanations offered by legitimate political or scientific
authorities. In particular, NfCC can be seen as a need to
immediately avoid uncertainty and find clear beliefs about reality
(that could support conspiracy theories). Individuals with high
NfCC tend to make swift judgments and resist revising them
once formed (Roets et al., 2015; Livi et al., 2015). This urgency
for closure supports group norm adherence and can enhance
sensitivity to salient explanations—including conspiratorial
narratives—especially in contexts of perceived threat or social
instability (Prislei et al., 2024). Moreover, NfCC has been
linked to greater alignment with binding moral foundations
(e.g., authority, in-group loyalty) and a preference for cultural
tightness, both of which may reinforce exclusionary or rigid
worldviews (De Cristofaro et al., 2019; Prislei et al., 2024).
Although some studies have demonstrated a tendency for
NfCC to predict conspiratorial beliefs (Staszak et al., 2022),
other research suggests that this is context-dependent. One
study showed that NfCC was a good predictor of adopting
a conspiratorial interpretation of ambiguous events, but
only when the conspiratorial explanation was made salient
(Marchlewska et al., 2017). Leman & Cinnirella (2013) found
that some people were more likely to accept certain conspiracy
explanations for events: participants with lower NfCC were
more motivated to attend to and scrutinize the evidence in
more detail (Klein & Webster, 2000).
The present research hypothesized a moderated mediation
model, considering the role of Need for Cognitive Closure as
a moderator in the relationship between System Justification
(SJ) and General Conspiracy Beliefs (GCBs), which should
be a mediator in the relationship between SJ and Specific
Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention (SCBs/Intention). Furthermore,
we hypothesized a moderation effect by NfCC in the
relationship between GCBs and SCBs/Intention. Besides, it
was hypothesized a major impact of conspiracy priming on
SCBs/Intention compared to anti-conspiracy priming and the
combination of the two kinds of priming.

Method
Participants
The sample size was estimated using an a priori power analysis
using the dedicated part of the software WARP PLS v. 8.0
(Kock, 2024) and the gamma-exponential method (Kock &

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Need for Cognitive Closure in System Justification and Conspiracy Beliefs

Hadaya, 2018). Presupposing a relatively small path coefficient
(β = 0.21) between the considered variables (based upon
previous research; Pellegrini et al., 2024), a significance level of
0.05, and a power of 0.80, the required sample size emerged to
be 130. Thus, the study was conducted among 138 university
students. The questionnaire was organized and administered
using the Qualtrics questionnaire design software. The sample
consisted of 115 females and 20 males (3 people did not
specify his/her gender). The participants ranged from 19 to
40 years (age M = 20.84, age SD = 2.25). Participants gave
their informed consent to participate. This study was approved
by the ethical committee of Sapienza University of Rome
(Protocol No.: CERT_18D13473DE6). All methods and
procedures were conducted in accordance with Helsinki’s
Declaration.
Procedure
The participation link for the study was distributed during
a university course at Sapienza University of Rome. Upon
providing their informed consent, students who indicated
their willingness to take part were granted access to the
questionnaire, hosted by the Qualtrics platform. The total
number of participants was equally and randomly allocated to
the four experimental conditions (Conspiracy Priming vs Anticonspiracy Priming vs Conspiracy Priming / Anti-conspiracy
Priming vs Anti-conspiracy Priming / Conspiracy Priming).
After reading the stimuli, participants answered a
question about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to measure
their engagement in the specific conspiracy theory. The
term “conspiracy” has never been reported in the stimuli
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008). At the end of the proposed
questionnaire, we specified that the text reported contained
baseless conspiracy beliefs. All the stimuli are available in
the Appendix. The four conditions were designed to explore
both the content and order effects of priming. The inclusion
of a priming procedure is useful to experimentally activate
specific cognitive frames, either supportive or critical of
conspiracy thinking, prior to measuring participants’
endorsement of a conspiracy theory. This method serves
to test the causal effect of exposure to conspiracy content
on belief formation. Indeed, the final two conditions were
included to provide a clearer understanding of how the
sequence of stimuli modulates cognitive processing and
subsequently shapes participants’ responses. Specifically,
the first two conditions isolate the effect of a single type of
priming, while the latter two conditions allow for examining
sequence effects: whether presenting opposing perspectives
in a specific order influences the impact of the priming.
The previous procedure was adapted from previously used
measures (Jolley & Douglas, 2017). In the aforementioned
study, participants were randomly assigned to different
experimental conditions in which they read conspiracy and/
or anti-conspiracy articles presenting opposing perspectives on
vaccine safety.
Our main hypothesis was that participants exposed solely
to conspiracy priming would show higher levels of conspiracy
theories endorsement regarding the Russian-Ukrainian

29

conflict, compared to those in the anti-conspiracy condition
or the mixed conditions. Moreover, we hypothesized that anticonspiracy priming presented last (Condition 4) would be
less effective in reducing conspiracy beliefs than when it was
presented first (Condition 3), due to recency and confirmation
bias effects.
This approach enabled us to investigate not only whether
priming works, but also how the structure and sequence of
information influenced belief updating and resistance to
misinformation.
Measures
Tendency to support a specific conspiracy theory. 1 Likert-like
item was used to understand if the stimulus/stimuli affected
the tendency to adhere to a conspiracy theory concerning
the Russian-Ukrainian war and the subsequent intention to
support Russia (1 = absolutely not convinced to 10 = absolutely
convinced; “If I were a young Russian, I would defend my
nation’s interests”). The item’s formulation is intended to
elicit an empathetic perspective-taking toward the conspiracy
priming. Its selection is grounded in the assumption that
even a hypothetical identification with such a viewpoint may
indicate a heightened propensity to endorse specific conspiracy
narratives, particularly those related to the geopolitical conflict
in question.
General tendency to support conspiracy theories. This
tendency was measured using the Generic Conspiracist
Beliefs Scale (GCB scale) (Brotherton et al., 2013). This
scale is made up of 56 items about widespread conspiracy
theories about events that actually occurred. Participants
rated items on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1: definitely not
true to 5: definitely true). The instrument includes five factors:
government malfeasance (e.g., “The government has employed
people in secret to assassinate others”), extraterrestrial cover-up
(e.g., “Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the
public”), malevolent global conspiracy (e.g., “A small, secret
group of people is actually in control of the world economy”),
personal well-being (e.g., “Cures for certain deadly and
common diseases exist, but are being deliberately withheld”),
and control of information (e.g., “A lot of information about
diseases and treatments is withheld from the public) (α = .966,
ω = .967). While correlations were examined using individual
factor scores of the GCB scale, the moderated mediation
model was conducted using a composite score.
System Justification. People’s level of System Justification
was evaluated with the Italian version of the System Justification
Scale (e.g., “In general, you find society to be fair”; Roccato et
al., 2014). Participants were asked to respond to 8 items from
1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree (α = .673, ω = .712).
Need for Cognitive Closure. It was measured using the
short version (14 items) of the Italian version of the Need for
Cognitive Closure Scale (e.g., “I generally avoid participating
in discussions about ambiguous and controversial issues”;
Pierro & Kruglanski, 2005), already used in the Italian context
(i.a., Parisse et al., 2023). Participants were asked to rate
each statement on a scale from 1: completely disagree to 6:
completely agree (α = .809, ω = .813).

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Mariateres Loverrea, Matteo Bonora, Stefano Livi, Fabio Lucidi, and Andrea Chirico

Data analysis
Pearson correlations were performed to process the bivariate
correlations between the key variables, using Jamovi (Jamovi,
2023).
We used variance-based structural equation modeling (VBSEM) to test our hypothesis, employing WARP PLS statistical
software (Kock, 2024). In the abovementioned analysis,
measurement error is explicitly modeled through constructing
latent factors, much like a covariance-based SEM analysis.
Furthermore, VB-SEM estimates models through the use of
ranked data, which is distribution-free. Model complexity,
sample size, and deviations of the variable distributions from
normality have less impact on model estimation. Following
the published criteria for VB-SEM models, VB-SEM can
evaluate the model at the measurement and structural levels.
Considering the measurement level, VB-SEM defines the
construct validity of the latent factors with the average variance
extracted (AVE) and the composite reliability coefficients
(ρ), which should respectively be more than .50 and .70.
Considering the structural level, VB-SEM determines the
adequacy of the hypothesized relations among the constructs
employing the goodness-of-fit (GoF) index resulting from the
square root of the product between AVE and the average R2
for the model with values of .10, .25, and .36 which indicates
respectively small, medium, and large effect sizes for model fit
(Tenenhaus et al., 2005). The average path coefficient (APC)
and average R2 (ARS) coefficients are helpful to understand
the model’s adequacy, both of which should be statistically
significantly different from zero. The full collinearity variance
inflation factor (AFVIF) measures multicollinearity: values
below 3.300 indicate an acceptable level of multicollinearity.
According to our hypothesis, we tested a moderated
mediation model, evaluating the role of NfCC as a moderator

in the relationship between System Justification (SJ) and
General Conspiracy Beliefs (GCBs), which is a mediator in
the relationship between SJ and Specific Conspiracy Beliefs
(SCBs) /Intention. As seen in our Path Diagram (Figure 1),
we also hypothesized a moderation effect by NfCC in the
relationship between GCBs and SCBs/Intention.

Results
Correlations
As shown in Table 1, there is a correlation between all factors
of GCBs and their composite measure. Notably, a correlation
between SJ and SCBs/Intention emerged. Although not
statistically significant, there was a marginal correlation
between SJ and GCBs.
Priming Effect
To test the Priming effect, a One-way Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) was performed: results showed a significant effect
of the Priming on Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intentions (F(3,
131) = 2.923, p < .05, = .063), the priming effect was not
significant for General Conspiracy Beliefs (F(3, 131) = 1.176,
p = .32, = .026), two participants were excluded from the
analysis because they did not provide complete responses to
the scale measuring belief in general and specific conspiracy
theory. In a post hoc analysis, we compared the mean scores of
each level of the priming using Tukey’s multiple comparison of
means test: results were significant only when considering the
difference between the Conspiracy Priming (M = 3.648, SD =

Tab. 1. Correlation matrix between key variables.
1
—
.683***
.711***
.786***
.498***
-.139
.061
.094
.845***

1. Government Malfeasance
2. Personal well-being
3. Malevolent Global Conspiracy
4. Control of Information
5. Extraterrestrial Cover-Up
6. System Justification
7. Need for Cognitive Closure
8. Specific Conspiracies Beliefs
9. General Conspiracies Beliefs

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

—
.699***
.802***
.637***
-.113
.120
.158
.889***

—
.729***
.571***
-.192
.046
.077
.876***

—
.523***
-.201*
.144
.113
.886***

—
-.035
.002
-.042
.778***

—
.135
.294***
-.150

—
.168
.095

—
.081

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Tab. 2. Effect of the Priming on Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention and difference between means.
Manipulation

n

M

SD

Comparison

Diff

p

C

37

3.648

2.084

AC

32

2.400

1.302

vs. AC
vs. C+ AC
vs. AC + C
vs. C+ AC

1.248
.677
1.113
-.571

vs. AC + C
vs. AC + C

C+AC

35

2.971

2.134

AC+C

34

2.515

2.063

95% C.I.
Lower

Upper

.049
.455
.076
.641

.003
-.517
-.080
-1.83

2.493
1.872
2.347
.690

-.115

.995

-1.393

1.163

.456

.769

-.773

1.686

Note: C: Conspiracy Priming; AC: Anti-conspiracy Priming; C+AC: Conspiracy Priming/Anti conspiracy Priming; AC+C: Anti-conspiracy Priming /
Conspiracy Priming

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Need for Cognitive Closure in System Justification and Conspiracy Beliefs

2.084) and Anti-Conspiracy Priming (M = 2.400, SD = 1.302;
Diff = 1.248, p = .049, 95% C.I. = 2.494; .049). Results for
other comparisons can be found in Table 2.
Moderated mediation model1
According to our hypotheses, the moderated mediation model
showed an ideal fit (GoF = .281; APC = .213, p = .002; ARS
= .119, p = .039; AVIF = 1.009). All hypothesized paths
presented significant relationships between the latent variables.
In particular, there is a direct relation between SJ and SCBs/
Intention (β = .31, SE = .03, p < .01) and GCBs (β = -.15,
SE = .02, p = .04). The two hypothesized moderation effects
of NfCC on the relation of SJ and GCBs and between GBCs
and SCBs/Intention were significant (respectively β = .21, SE =
.05, p < .01, and β = .17, SE = .04, p = .02). The link between
GCBs and SCBs/Intention was also significant (β = .23, SE =
.03, p < .01). The path coefficients of the model are reported
in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Moderated mediation model * p< .01, ** p= .04, ***p= .02

p < .001, 95% C.I.: -.043; -.017). Indicating that for mean
levels of NfCC, justifying the system is negatively associated
with specific conspiracy beliefs through a reduced adherence to
general conspiracy beliefs. The indirect effects for low levels of
the moderator (β = -.003, SE = .02, p = .820, 95% C.I.: -.003;
.030) and high levels of it (β = .02, SE = .02, p = .245, 95%
C.I.: -.016; .063) were not significant.
Tab. 3. Simple slopes for the relation between SJ on GCBS and GCBS
on SCBS.
Effect
SJ → GCBS

GCBS → SCBS

Moderator
Level

β

SE

p

Low
Mean
High
Low
Mean
High

-.35
-.15
.06
.01
.20
.39

.05
.02
.05
.05
.03
.05

<.001
<.001
.245
.820
<.001
<.001

C.I. 95%
LL
-.025
-.19
-.04
-.08
.13
.29

UL
-.08
-.09
.16
.11
.26
.48

Discussion

To investigate the effect of the moderator on the indirect
effects, we implemented a Monte Carlo approach to estimate
both the single moderated associations between SJ and GCBs,
GCBs and SCBs, and the indirect effects at three different
levels of the moderator (i.e., NfCC; -1 SD, Mean, 1 SD). Since
this was not yet implemented in WarpPLS, we used R (R Core
Team, 2024) to firstly simulate the moderated association of
the single paths, then the indirect moderated association using
20000 Monte Carlo draws for each simulation. As seen in
Table 3, the relationship between SJ and GCBs emerged as
significant at low (β = -.35, SE = .05, p < .001, 95% C.I.: -.45;
-.25) and mean levels (β = -.15, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% C.I.:
-.19; -.09) of NfCC. These results suggest that the negative
association between system justification and general conspiracy
beliefs is stronger for individuals with low levels of cognitive
closure. Regarding the relationship between GCBs and SCBs
moderated by the NfCC, the simple slope analysis revealed
that the positive relationship between general conspiracy
beliefs and specific conspiracy beliefs was significant for mean
(β = .20, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% C.I.: .13; .26) and high (β
= .39, SE = .05, p < .001, 95% C.I.: .29; .48) levels of NfCC.
When looking at the overall indirect moderated
relationship, results shows that only the indirect effect for a
mean level of the moderator was significant (β = -.03, SE = .01,

One of the main scopes of our study was to determine whether
General Conspiracy Beliefs mediate the association between
System Justification and Specific Conspiracy Beliefs/Intention
at different values of Need for Cognitive Closure.
Our findings support the assumption of a mediating role
for GCBs. Previous studies have analyzed the relationship
between System Justification Theory and conspiracy theory:
both frameworks explain respective constructs through the
satisfaction of relational, epistemic, and existential needs. Indeed,
supporting conspiracy beliefs might represent an alternative
path to satisfying these needs when system justification is
untenable (Jolley et al., 2018). People are motivated to justify
the status quo, but could paradoxically endorse conspiracy
theories when their social system is threatened. Goertzel (2010)
claimed that conspiracy theories propose someone tangible to
blame: they identify a small group of wrongdoers within the
system who are responsible for the ills of society (Ellard et al.,
2002). The motivated defense of social systems via conspiracy
theories is similar to preserving many cherished social beliefs.
Supporting conspiracy theories lets people attribute problems
to the negative programs of outsiders, so they do not question
their system. In line with the current literature, the present
work found similar results by reversing the direction of the
relationship between constructs, considering the complex and
potentially bidirectional nature of this relationship: SJ has a
negative relation with GCBs (Pellegrini et al., 2024).
The mediating role of GCBs could be explained by belief
consistency (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). Literature suggests
that those who endorse one conspiracy theory tend to endorse
others without a rationale mechanism: this inclination was
named “conspiracist ideation” (Swami et al., 2011). Douglas
& Sutton (2011) proposed a socio–psychological mechanism
that explained the endorsement of conspiracy theories: they
hypothesized a stable individual difference in the general
tendency to engage with conspiracist explanations for events,
regardless of the specific theme. The monological nature of

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Mariateres Loverrea, Matteo Bonora, Stefano Livi, Fabio Lucidi, and Andrea Chirico

conspiracism is driven by the coherence of each theory with
higher-order beliefs that foster the idea of general conspiracy
beliefs (Swami et al., 2011). This system encourages easy
and automatic explanations for all unknown phenomena,
particularly factors that threaten the system itself.
Results seemed to sustain our moderator hypotheses: NfCC
moderated the relationship between SJ and GCBs, reducing the
negative magnitude of this relationship for people with higher
need of cognitive closure. While counterintuitive, this effect
may be explained by the broad perspective given by the system
justification. In fact, it seems more plausible that people who
have low levels of cognitive rigidity may have their existential,
relational, and epistemic needs satisfied by a broad concept
such as system justification, making the satisfaction given
by the conspiracy beliefs less prominent. Conversely, people
with higher levels of NfCC may be more keen to search for
satisfaction of their needs through more concrete and immediate
narratives, such as the ones provided by endorsing conspiracy
beliefs. This is partially in contrast with previous literature. In
fact, research that has delved into the relationship between SJ
and GCBs provides different accounts of their interplay. On
the one hand, Jolley and colleagues (2017) sustain that the two
are positively related to each other. On the other hand, and
more in line with our results, Pellegrini et al. (2024) showed
how system justification may function as a protective factor in
the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. With this research, we
extend their work by taking into account the role of NfCC in
this relationship. Conversely, NfCC played an opposite role in
the relationship between GCBs and SCBs/Intention, increasing
the positive relationship between the aforementioned construct
at higher levels. The increase of the relationship at higher
levels of NfCC suggests that people with high levels of general
conspiracy beliefs who are more prone to engage in seizing and
freezing (classical components of the need for cognitive closure;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) may be keen to endorse beliefs in
specific conspiracies (similarly to what is asserted in Marchlewska
et al., 2017). NfCC may influence the motivational heuristics
responsible for interpreting information; a high level of NfCC
produces a reliance on confirmation heuristics (De Dreu et al.,
1999) that results in a strengthening of available beliefs. People
high in NfCC have a peculiar mindset structure, characterized
by a need to eliminate uncertainty immediately, find clear
beliefs about reality, and form quick judgments on any given
topic (Roets et al., 2015). Other studies show that a hardnosed conspiracy theorist searches for evidence that conforms
to a particular view (Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). In our study,
we saw that having a medium level of NfCC may reduce the
negative effect of system justification on the general attitude to
endorse conspiracy theories (Marchlewska et al., 2018). This
is in line with previous literature that shows how people who
are cognitively closed are more likely to endorse conspiracy
theories, even supporting theories without proven principles
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).
Results showed that conspiracy priming had a stronger
effect on SCBs/Intention than anti-conspiracy priming. The
stimulus that promoted conspiracy ideas was also stronger
than the combination of the two kinds of priming in the two
orders. It demonstrated that our priming effectively affected
conspiracy ideas about a specific conspiracy theory, influencing

the tendency to adhere to a conspiracy theory concerning the
Russian-Ukrainian war and the subsequent intention to support
Russia. Nonsignificant data regarding the effect of conspiracy
priming on SCBs may indicate that the two stimuli operate
relatively independently from one another, influencing beliefs
without the order of presentation significantly affecting their
effectiveness. Such independence suggests that the reception
and processing of contradictory information may occur in
parallel or separately within participants’ minds, resulting in
stable responses regardless of order.
These results help us better understand psychological
constructs and complex dynamics that directly or indirectly
foster the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Studies show
that these theories also modify people’s attitudes in political
matters, and an international trend is seen in the general increase
in the use of conspiracy theories in political affairs (Moore,
2016). Thus, conspiracy theories can be harmful: preventing
their deleterious effects is desirable. Interventions focused on
educating people before their exposure to conspiracy theories
may be effective. The approach could provide an attempt to
protect people against conspiracy theories by warning them
about manipulative dynamics to which they will be subjected.
Limitations
The present study is not exempt from limitations. First, our
data should be read with caution because of the low sample size,
which may affect the external validity of the results. Besides, the
sample size used compelled us to use a specific type of analysis:
PLS-SEM. Adopting PLS-SEM entails features aimed at raising
accuracy and statistical power using resampling. A “stable”
resampling method has been used that causes a tendency to
generate low standard errors, with small samples and mediumto-high effect sizes (Kock, 2018). Furthermore, the type of
power analysis conducted resulted in a required sample size
below the commonly used minimum sample size for the PLS
models (Hair et al., 2022; Kock & Hadaya, 2018; Kock, 2024,
p. 24), suggesting a possible issue of underpower. On the same
topic, the effect size emerged from our analysis is below the
expected one, making our results not consistently interpretable.
Future research should try to use a larger sample size to address
this issue. Another limit is given to the high response variance
of our sample, which could have been the reason for the nonsignificant results in the post hoc pairwise t-test conducted. It
is important to highlight that our sample consisted entirely of
young university students (age M = 20.84). This demographic
characteristic may have influenced the scores on both GCBs and
SCBs/Intention, as previous research indicates that lower levels of
education are associated with higher endorsement of conspiracy
beliefs (Douglas et al., 2016). An important limitation of the
study’s procedure is the absence of a manipulation check to
verify the effectiveness of administering the primings and the
consequent SCB measure. Furthermore, the Cronbach’s alpha
for the system justification scale results below the commonly
accepted threshold of .70, which could be an indication of low
reliability in the measure adopted. It is important to underline
that, even if lower than .70, the alpha is .67, so relatively close to
the threshold, and that the system justification scale is a widely

PsyHub

Need for Cognitive Closure in System Justification and Conspiracy Beliefs

used scale that has been validated also in Italy (Roccato et al.,
2014). In conclusion, the measure of tendency to support a
specific conspiracy theory presents notable limitations. Using a
single-item scale does not ensure adequate reliability or content
validity. Moreover, the item itself is inherently ambiguous and
may reflect broader political or patriotic attitudes, rather than
clearly endorsing a specific conspiracy theory.
Notes
1
Despite the evaluation of alternative models, the model
presented in the manuscript is the only one that exhibits an
acceptable level of fit and significance.
Ethical Approval
The CERT Ethics Review Committee at Sapienza
University
of
Rome
approved
our
interviews
(approval:CERT_18D13473DE6) on February 27, 2024.
Respondents gave written consent for review and signature
before starting interviews.
Data Availability Statement
We are committed to ensuring the transparency and
reproducibility of our research. Therefore, the data supporting
this study are openly available at the following link: https://osf.
io/wpjev/?view_only=6856068b92b8425e98d772983f75c4bb
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article
Author Contributions
Mariateresa Loverre: Conceptualization; Data curation;
Investigation; Methodology; Writing – original draft; Writing
– review & editing
Matteo Bonora: Data curation; Formal analysis; Methodology;
Software; Validation; Visualization; Writing – original draft;
Writing – review & editing
Stefano Livi: Conceptualization; Project administration;
Supervision; Writing – review & editing
Fabio Lucidi: Supervision
Andrea Chirico: Conceptualization; Formal analysis; Project
administration; Supervision; Writing – review & editing
Supplementary material
Not applicable

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</reference>

<statements>
1. A large body of work shows that need for closure is positively, though usually weakly to moderately, associated with endorsement of conspiracy explanations, which are a common form of misinformation.
</statements>

Begin the assessment now. Output only the JSON list, without any conversational text or explanations.