You will be provided with a reference and some statements. Please determine whether each statement is 'supported', 'unsupported', or 'unknown' with respect to the reference. Please note:
First, assess whether the reference contains any valid content. If the reference contains no valid information, such as a 'page not found' message, then all statements should be considered 'unknown'.
If the reference is valid, for a given statement: if the facts or data it contains can be found entirely or partially within the reference, it is considered 'supported' (data accepts rounding); if all facts and data in the statement cannot be found in the reference, it is considered 'unsupported'.

You should return the result in a JSON list format, where each item in the list contains the statement's index and the judgment result, for example:
[
    {
        "idx": 1,
        "result": "supported"
    },
    {
        "idx": 2,
        "result": "unsupported"
    }
]

Below are the reference and statements:
<reference>
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1980, Vol. 39, No. 5, 752-766

Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and
the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion
Shelly Chaiken
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
In Experiment 1, subjects read a persuasive message from a likable or unlikable
communicator who presented six or two arguments concerning one of two topics.
High response involvement subjects anticipated discussing the message topic at
a future experimental session, whereas low involvement subjects anticipated discussing a different topic. For high involvement subjects, opinion change was
significantly greater given six arguments but was unaffected by communicator
likability. For low involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater
given a likable communicator but was unaffected by the arguments manipulation.
In Experiment 2, high issue involvement subjects showed slightly greater opinion
change when exposed to five arguments from an unlikable (vs. one argument
from a likable) communicator, whereas low involvement subjects exhibited significantly greater persuasion in response to one argument from a likable (vs. five
arguments from an unlikable) communicator. These findings support the idea
that high involvement leads message recipients to employ a systematic information processing strategy in which message-based cognitions mediate persuasion,
whereas low involvement leads recipients to use a heuristic processing strategy
in which simple decision rules mediate persuasion. Support was also obtained
for the hypothesis that content-mediated (vs. source-mediated) opinion change
would shower greater persistence.
This research distinguishes between a systematic and a heuristic view of persuasion,
Both conceptualizations regard message recipients as concerned with assessing the
validity of the message's overall conclusion,

According to a systematic view, recipients
exert considerable cognitive effort in performing this task: They actively attempt to comprehend and evaluate the message's arguments
as well as to assess their validity in relation
to the message's conclusion. In contrast, according to a heuristic view of persuasion, reThis article is based on a dissertation submitted cipients exert comparatively little effort in
in partial fulfillment of the doctoral requirements judging message validity: Rather than proat the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. The cessing argumentation, recipients may rely
author is grateful to Alice H. Eagly and Icek Ajzen Qn (typlcally) more accessible information
for their counsel and to John W. Fee III and John such, as the
,, source s , ., ...
.,
Keenan, who served as experimenters in Experiment
identity or other noni. John Bassili, Alice H. Eagly, Johnathan L. Freed- content cues in deciding to accept a message's
man, Melvin Manis, and Wendy Wood provided conclusion. In essence, a systematic view of
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manu- persuasion emphasizes detailed processing of
script. A report on Experiment 1 was presented at
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the meeting of the American Psychological Associ-

ation, Toronto, Canada, August 1978. Experiment 2
was partially funded by a grant from the Humanities
and Social Sciences Committee of the Research
Board of the University of Toronto.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Shelly
Chaiken, Department of Psychology, Ermdale College, University of Toronto, Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada LSL 1C6.

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sed cognitions in mediating opinion change,
whereas a heuristic view de-emphasizes detailed information processing and focuses on
the role of simple rules Qr cognitive heuristics
persuasion.
jn mediati
°*
Stimulated largely by traditional theorizing (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953;

Copyright 1980 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/80/3905-0752J00.75

7S2

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

McGuire, 1968, 1969), much persuasion research has assumed that source, message, and
audience variables affect opinion change to
the extent that they influence either message
reception (attention, comprehension) or yielding to what is received (cf. McGuire, 1968).
To better understand the distinction between
systematic versus heuristic processing, it is
useful to differentiate yielding to persuasive
argumentation from yielding to a message's
overall conclusion. In a systematic view, independent variables (e.g., source factors)
indirectly affect yielding to a message's conclusion and therefore persuasion via their direct impact on reception or argument-acceptance processes. According to a heuristic view,
such variables may directly influence the
recipient's willingness to accept the message's
conclusion without necessarily influencing reception or acceptance of argumentation.
Research suggesting that good comprehension of persuasive argumentation often facilitates opinion change (e.g., Chaiken & Eagly,
1976; Eagly, 1974; Eagly & Warren, 1976)
and research suggesting that distraction often
enhances persuasion by interfering with recipients' abilities to critically evaluate persuasive argumentation (e.g., Osterhouse &
Brock, 1970; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976)
illustrate a systematic view of persuasion.
Although little if any research has been explicitly guided by a heuristic view of persuasion, such a conceptualization seems warranted by research suggesting that recipients
often agree or disagree with a message primarily on the basis of their reactions to noncontent cues such as communicator credibility
(Miller, Maruyama, Beaber, & Valone, 1976),
perceived audience opinion (e.g., Landy,
1972; Silverthorne & Mazmanian, 1975), or
external feedback about recipients' own internal states (e.g., Giesen & Hendrick, 1974;
Hendrick & Giesen, 1976; Mintz & Mills,
1971). For example, Miller et al. (1976)
found that faster (communicator) speech
rates enhanced both perceptions of communicator credibility and persuasion. Finding no
evidence that the persuasive impact of speech
rate was mediated either by comprehension
effects or by counterargument disruption, the
authors concluded that subjects may have
predicated their opinion judgments simply on

753

the basis of whether the communicator
seemed credible. Such a conclusion calls to
mind McGuire's (1969) "lazy organism" message-recipient who utilizes source-linked information as a cue for accepting or rejecting
the message "without really absorbing the
arguments used" (p. 198).
Heuristic information processing may involve the use of relatively general rules
(scripts, schemata) developed by individuals
through their past experiences and observations (cf. Abelson, 1976; Stotland & Canon,
1972). For example, persons may possess and
utilize the rule or categorical script (Abelson, 1976) that statements by experts can
usually be considered veridical, or that statements by generally trustworthy persons probably reflect those persons' honest opinions.
With respect to source attractiveness, recipients may agree with attractive communicators
because they employ the rule that "people
generally agree with people they like." Such
a script may derive from past experiences
with others or, alternatively, may stem from
a lower-order rule suggesting a fairly consistent association between the concepts of
liking and interpersonal similarity (Stotland
& Canon, 1972). Other heuristics may underlie the persuasive impact of other cues. For
example, the finding that recipients are less
persuaded when an overheard audience expresses disapproval (vs. approval) of a message (Landy, 1972; Silverthorne & Mazmanian, 1975) might reflect their use of a consensus heuristic: Recipients may reject such
a message because most other recipients find
it unacceptable.
When will recipients employ a systematic
rather than heuristic processing strategy? A
heuristic strategy has the economic advantage
of requiring a minimum of cognitive effort.
Certainly, judging message acceptability on
the basis of noncontent cues is less effortful
than receiving and analyzing persuasive argumentation. Countering this advantage, a
heuristic strategy may be a less reliable means
of judging message validity. In the long run,
overreliance on simple decision rules may inflate Type 1 and Type 2 errors: Recipients
may sometimes accept (reject) message conclusions they might otherwise have (correctly) rejected (accepted) had they invested

754

SHELLY CHAIKEN

the time and effort to receive and scrutinize der conditions of low, but not high, issue
argumentation. A functional perspective sug- involvement (Rhine & Severence, 1970) and
gests that recipients will employ a systematic response involvement (Johnson & Scileppi,
strategy when reliability concerns outweigh 1969). Also, Petty and Capioppo (1979)
economic concerns, and a heuristic strategy recently found that a manipulation of argument strength had a greater persuasive imwhen economic concerns predominate.
Reliability concerns should be paramount pact when issue involvement was high. The
and a systematic strategy therefore employed present research systematically explored the
when recipients perceive that it is important utility of the systematic versus heuristic
to formulate a highly accurate or veridical analysis of persuasion and its implications reopinion judgment. Recipients are likely to garding the persuasive impact of source and
hold such a perception under conditions of message cues.
high "issue involvement" (Kiesler, Collins, &
Experiment 1
Miller, 1969) or high "response involvement"
Subjects read a persuasive message contain(Zimbardo, 1960). That is, when recipients
receive messages on personally important ing six or two arguments from a likable or untopics or when recipients feel that their opin- likable communicator under conditions of
ion judgments have important consequences high or low response involvement ("consefor themselves (e.g., recipients may expect to quences"). It was expected that high involvediscuss or defend their opinions, or to engage ment subjects would employ a systematic
in behavior congruent with their expressed processing strategy and would therefore show
opinions) or for others (e.g., jurors' verdicts). greater opinion change in response to mesWhen asked for an opinion on an unimpor- sages containing six arguments but would be
tant topic or when one's opinion judgment is unaffected by the likability manipulation. In
perceived as inconsequential, recipients may contrast, it was expected that low involvement
give economic concerns greater weight and subjects would employ a heuristic strategy
and would therefore express greater agreeemploy a heuristic processing strategy.
This analysis has implications regarding ment with the likable communicator but
the relative impact of source and message would be unaffected by the arguments manipvariables on persuasion. In the systematic ulation.
The experiment also explored opinion perview, recipients focus primarily on message
sistence.
It was assumed that opinion change
content. Although source or other noncontent
would
persist
to the extent that it was bolcues may sometimes be used as aids in assessing the validity of persuasive argumentation, stered by topic-relevant cognitions. It was
such cues may be used in only a secondary also assumed that recipients who adopted a
manner. Thus, when recipients employ a sys- belief on the basis of who the communicator
tematic processing strategy, message charac- was would possess fewer supportive cogniteristics (e.g., amount, comprehensibility, tions than recipients who adopted a belief on
validity of persuasive argumentation) may the basis of what the communicator said.
exert a stronger impact on persuasion than These assumptions led to the hypothesis that
source characteristics (e.g., credibility, lik- the presumably content-mediated (initial)
ability). Conversely, in the heuristic view of opinion change manifested by high involvepersuasion, recipients avoid detailed process- ment subjects would show greater persistence
ing of message content and instead rely on than the presumably source-mediated opinion
information such as the source's identity in change manifested by low involvement subjudging message acceptability. Thus, when jects. To test this hypothesis, subjects' opinrecipients employ a heuristic strategy, source ions were reassessed approximately 10 days
characteristics may exert a greater impact on after their laboratory participation.
persuasion than message characteristics.
Method
Consistent with the above reasoning, pre- Subjects
vious researchers have shown that source
Subjects were 207 male and female University of
credibility significantly affects persuasion un- Massachusetts undergraduates who participated for

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

755

extra course credit in sessions containing up to six
subjects. Nine subjects were eliminated because they
suspected an influence attempt (three) or questioned
the cover story (six). Data from IS others were
discarded because they were not administered the
delayed opinion posttest (13), or because they associated the posttest with their laboratory participation (two). 1

various student organizations. After praising or insulting undergraduates in response to a question
from the interviewer, the communicator was asked
for his opinion on his "assigned" topic (sleep habits
or trimester system). The remainder of the transcript consisted of the communicator's statement of
his overall position (see below) and his presentation
of various supportive arguments.

Procedure

Independent Variables

At the first (in actuality, the only) session of a
"two-session experiment on opinions and group discussions," the experimenter explained that subjects
would receive "discussion topics," give their opinions
on these topics, and respond to another questionnaire. Subjects learned that at "the second session"
they would be individually interviewed about their
opinions on their assigned topics and then discuss
their opinions in groups. After this introduction,
each subject received a list of five topics and, via a
sham random drawing, was assigned one of two
topics (sleep habits or the trimester system) from
this list.
Justifying the persuasive message, the experimenter stated that subjects would read an opinion
interview conducted in a related study to "get an
idea of what their own interview would be like."
The experimenter noted that the related study had
used the same topics but had employed university
administrators and faculty, rather than undergraduates, as subjects. Subjects then received an interview transcript (persuasive message, see below) to
read. Afterwards, subjects completed a questionnaire
that solicited their opinions on all five topics.
"As a second experimental focus" subjects next
completed a questionnaire assessing their "reactions
to the interview transcripts." This questionnaire
contained the remaining dependent measures (see
below). Finally, subjects were excused after being
told that they would be scheduled for "Session 2"
later in the semester.
Approximately 10 days later (mean delay = 10.39
days; range = 8-15 days), subjects were telephoned
by an experimenter who was blind to experimental
condition. Under the guise of conducting a campus
opinion survey, the experimenter solicited subjects'
agreement with various opinion statements, two of
which corresponded to the positions advocated in
the messages presented at the laboratory session.
After probing for suspicion regarding the relationship between the posttest and the laboratory session,
the experimenter thanked subjects for cooperating
in the telephone survey. Subsequently, debriefing
letters were mailed to "all participants.

Perceived consequences. Response involvement,
or perceived consequences, was manipulated by presenting subjects with a message on a topic identical
to or different from the topic they were assigned
to be interviewed on and discuss at the "second
experimental session." Some subjects assigned to the
sleep/trimester topic received a sleep/trimester message (high consequences), whereas others received a
trimester/sleep message (low consequences).
Communicator likability. Likability was manipulated via the communicator's response to the interviewer's question, "How do you like working with
undergraduates?" (cf. Eagly & Chaiken, 197S;
Jones & Brehm, 1967). This response appears below.
Phrases specific to the likable or the unlikable version are enclosed in parentheses or brackets, respectively.
Well, as a matter of fact, I (really enjoy it a lot)
[don't really enjoy it very much]. When I first
started my job here at the university I was a
little apprehensive about the idea of working so
much with undergraduates. Over the years, (however, I've realized that my apprehension was unjustified) [I'm sorry to say, I think that my apprehension has been justified]. The undergraduates
who I've met both in my work with various
student organizations and in other settings as well,
strike me as being pretty (responsible and mature)
[irresponsible and immature]. They're really (concerned) [unconcerned], I think, with their role
in society. I don't know, of course, but sometimes
I think that the public too often (underestimates)
[overestimates] the ability and maturity of today's
college student. They (just don't give undergraduates enough credit) [give undergraduates more
credit than they deserve]. Anyway, (it's no wonder
that) [sometimes I wonder why] I continue to
do the work I do. ...
For me, working with
undergraduates (has been pretty) [really hasn't
been very] rewarding.
Topic and position advocated. Two topics, sleep
habits and the trimester system, were used. The
positions advocated in the persuasive messages were
"People should sleep much less than 8 hours per

Interview Transcripts
The transcripts began with an interviewer asking
an interviewee (communicator) for background information. The communicator was portrayed as a
male university administrator who worked with

1
Including these IS subjects in analyses performed
on initial opinion change and other measures assessed at the laboratory session yielded findings
virtually identical to those reported in the text.

756

SHELLY CHAIKEN

night," and "The university should switch from its
two-semester system to a trimester system." Topics
and positions were selected after pretesting with an
additional 50 subjects who indicated their agreement with various opinion statements. The major
selection criterion was that the two statements be
counterattitudinal and have similar mean ratings on
the 15-point agreement scale (Ms = 10.72 and 10.54
for sleep and trimester topics, respectively, where
1 signified strong agreement). Because of the study's
focus on response involvement (consequences) rather
than issue involvement, an additional criterion required the topics to be rated similarly and not extremely on personal importance. The sleep and trimester topics were considered "neither important nor
unimportant" (Ms — 8.07 and 7.34, respectively, on
a 15-point scale) by pilot subjects (N — 2 2 ) .
Number of arguments. Amount of persuasive
argumentation was varied by preparing messages
containing six or two supportive arguments. Two
renditions of each message type were written. Each
rendition of the longer message presented the same
six arguments in a different (randomly selected)
order. Each rendition of the shorter message contained two different arguments drawn randomly
from the pool of six.

position, and each supportive argument that the
communicator had presented. An argument was
scored correct if in the opinion of two independent
raters (r = .86) it accurately summarized an argument appearing in the message. All subjects recalled
the message's topic and all but four (retained in the
analyses) accurately specified its overall position.
Other measures. To measure the effort subjects
expended processing message content, the experimenter covertly recorded the time each subject
spent reading the interview transcript. On the last
page of the reactions questionnaire, subjects rated
the message topic's importance, their desire to be
well informed on the topic, the effort they had
spent reading the message, the relative amount of
time they had spent thinking about the communicator's arguments (vs. his personal characteristics),
and their interest in the communicator's arguments
(all on 15-point scales). Subjects also indicated
their age, sex, and assigned topics. In the laboratory,
subjects wrote down their interpretations of the
study; over the telephone, they were asked if they'd
been in any similar opinion surveys. These responses
were coded for suspicion.

Measuring Instruments

The design included two levels each of perceived consequences, communicator likability,
number of arguments, message topic, subject
sex, and message rendition (nested within
levels of topic and number of arguments).
Since preliminary analyses yielded few effects
due to message rendition, all reported analyses
ignored this variable. Of the few sex and topic
effects yielded by the reported analyses, only
those relevant to the major hypotheses are
presented here.

Opinions. Immediately after message exposure,
subjects indicated their agreement with the overall
positions stated in the persuasive messages (see
above) by marking 15-point scales anchored by
agree strongly and disagree strongly. During the
delayed telephone posttest, subjects indicated their
agreement with similarly worded opinion statements by responding orally to 5-point scales anchored by definitely agree and definitely disagree.
Thoughts. On the questionnaire assessing their
"reactions to the interview transcript," subjects were
first given 3 minutes to list their "thoughts" about
the communicator's statements. Thoughts were
scored by two independent raters as message-oriented or communicator-oriented (M, C) and as
positively, negatively, or neutrally valenced (+,
—, 0). Examples of statements placed in each category along with interrater reliability coefficients
(Pearson rs) are: M + (r = .86): "The economic
advantages of the trimester agree with me"; M —
(r =.&&): "Reason for trimester not sound logically"; M0(r =.86): "He said REM (sleep) can
be controlled"; C + (r = .85): "He was very
polite"; C - (r = .82): "He was a little closeminded"; C O (r = .7S): "Hesitant about talking
about self." ~
Source perception. Subjects next rated the communicator on 15-point bipolar adjective scales. Positive poles of the 12 scales used were warm, knowlcdgable, modest, intelligent, approachable, competent, likable, trustworthy, pleasing, sincere, friendly,
and unbiased.
Message comprehension. Next, subjects were
asked to write down the message topic, its overall

Resets

2

Statements that could not be placed into any of
the six categories were coded as "other thoughts"
and were not analyzed. It should be noted that the
present thought-scoring procedure parallels to a certain extent scoring procedures typically used by persuasion researchers (e.g., Osterhouse & Brock, 1970).
Statements traditionally referred to as counterarguments and source derogations are, in the present
scheme, termed negative message-oriented thoughts
and negative communicator-oriented thoughts, respectively. Statements commonly referred to as supportive thoughts are, in the p'resent scheme, termed
positive message-oriented or communicator-oriented
thoughts depending on whether they refer more to
the message or more to the communicator. For each
type of thought, each independent rater judged the
number of such thoughts listed by each subject.
Interrater reliability was calculated separately for
each thought category by determining the correlation
between the two raters' judgments.

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

Check on Experimental Conditions
The communicator who praised (vs. insulted) undergraduates was judged more likable, Ms = 4.22 versus 8.83, F(l, 151) =
125.14, p < .001. Subjects recalled more persuasive arguments when the message contained six (vs. two) arguments, Ms = 2.81
versus 1.56, F(l, 151) = 76.18, p< .001.
Finally, the consequences manipulation successfully induced the conditions thought necessary to foster systematic versus heuristic information processing: High (vs. low) consequences subjects expressed a greater desire to
be well-informed on the message topic, Ms =
6.24 versus 7.05, F(l, 151) = 3.69, p < .06.
It is important to note that assignment to
topics did not lead subjects to "strategically"
shift their opinions (cf., Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976): Topic Assigned X Topic Received analyses of variance
on subjects' initial and delayed opinions on
the two topics yielded no significant effects
due to topic assignment (Fs < 1.0). The
topic-received main effect was significant on
all four opinion measures (ps < .05), indicating that the persuasive messages successfully shifted subjects' opinions.
Opinions
Mean opinion change scores for the primary experimental conditions appear in Table
1.3 Analysis on subjects' initial opinion change
scores revealed main effects due to communicator likability, F(l, 151) =4.16, p < .05;
number of arguments received, F(l, 151) =
6.14, p < .05; and message topic, F(l, 151)
= 4.56, p < .05. Overall, greater initial
change occurred given the likable (vs. unlikable) communicator (Ms = 2.54 vs. 1.51),
six (vs. two) persuasive arguments (Ms =
2.67 vs. 1.47), and trimester (vs. sleep)
messages (Ms = 2.60 vs. 1.59).
Planned comparisons on initial opinion
change yielded findings supportive of the
study's major hypothesis. As Figure 1 illustrates, high consequences subjects showed
greater initial opinion change in response to
six (vs. two) arguments, F(l, 151) =4.62,
p < .05, but were unaffected by communicator likability, F(l, 151) < 1.0. In contrast,
low consequences subjects showed greater

757

Table 1
Initial and Delayed Opinion Change as a
Function of Perceived Future Consequences,
Communicator Likability, and Number of
Arguments Presented: Experiment 1

Opinion
change

Likable
communicator

Unlikable
communicator

Six
arguments

Six
Two
argu- arguments ments

Two
arguments

Initial
Delayed

High perceived consequences
2.79
2.20
3.28
3.02
2.48
2.15

.48
.94

Initial
Delayed

Low perceived consequences
1.41
3.16
1.98
1.54
2.53
.70

.95
.47

Note. Cell ns range from 20 to 26.

initial opinion change given the likable (vs.
unlikable) communicator, F(l, 151) = 3.92,
p < .05, but were unaffected by the amount
of argumentation provided, F(l, 151) = 1.48,
ns. Although these results conformed to predictions, the differences between consequences
conditions proved statistically weak on an
overall basis. Of the interactions implied by
the major hypothesis, neither the Consequences X Arguments nor Consequences X
Likability interactions reached significance in
the full analysis of variance (ps — .24 and .25,
3
Initial opinions were measured on IS-point
scales and delayed opinions on 5-point scales. For
comparability, subjects' delayed opinion scores were
transformed to 15-point scales (see Minium, 1970,
p. 115). Opinion change scores were formed by
subtracting the mean opinion expressed by an internal control group from each subject's (initial or
delayed) opinion. All subjects receiving a sleep
message formed an internal control group on the
trimester topic for subjects reading a trimester
message, and all subjects who received a trimester
message served as internal controls on the sleep
topic for subjects reading a sleep message. The
opinions expressed by internal control subjects did
not differ significantly from those expressed by an
external control group of opinion-only pilot subjects:
For the sleep topic, M = 10.23 versus M = 10.72
for internal and external controls, respectively,
t(137)=.80; for the trimester topic, M- 10.32
versus M = 10.54 for internal and external controls,
respectively, ((142) = .34.

SHELLY CHAIKEN

758

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• LIKEABLE COMMUNICATOR
O UNLIKEABLE COMMUNICATOR

1

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• SIX ARGUMENTS
O TWO ARGUMENTS

i

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HIGH
CONSEQUENCES

LOW
CONSEQUENCES

Figure 1. Panel A depicts initial opinion change as
a function of communicator likability and perceived
consequences; Panel B depicts initial opinion change
as a function of number of arguments presented and
perceived consequences.

respectively), and the Consequences X Arguments X Likability interaction attained only
marginal significance (p < .10).
To explore opinion persistence, a repeated
measures analysis of variance employing time
of posttest (initial vs. delayed) as an additional design factor was performed. A time of
posttest main effect, F(l, 151) =3.96, p<
.05, revealed an overall trend for opinion
change to dissipate over the 10-day posttest
interval (Ms = 2.07 vs. 1.76)." The Time X
Consequences X Likability interaction, F(l,
151) = 4.00, p < .05, showed a data pattern
roughly in accord with the hypothesis that
greater persistence would be shown by high
consequences subjects. Regardless of communicator likability, the opinion change manifested by high consequences subjects remained
relatively stable between posttests: Ms =
2.48 versus 2.78, F< 1.0, for likable communicator; Ms = 1.88 versus 1.54, F< 1.0,
for unlikable communicator. In contrast,

opinion change declined significantly for low
consequences subjects exposed to the likable
communicator, Ms = 2.59 versus 1.65, F(l,
151) = 7.24, p < .01, although not for those
exposed to the unlikable communicator, Ms
= 1.18 versus 1.00, F < 1.0. The nonsignificant decrement in the latter condition probably reflects the fact that initial change in
this cell was low and only marginally greater
than zero, *(43) = 1.99, p < .10.
Paralleling the initial opinion change findings, the repeated measures analysis also
yielded between-subjects effects due to likability (p < .05), arguments (p < .05), and
a marginal effect due to message topic (p <
.10). In addition, a Consequences X Likability
X Arguments X Topic interaction (p < .05)
was obtained. This interaction indicated that
the primary experimental variables exerted a
stronger impact on opinions within trimester
(vs. sleep) message conditions even though
the patterning of opinion change means was
generally consistent within both topics.
Comprehension and Thoughts
In addition to the manipulation check noted
earlier, the analysis on argument recall yielded
a consequences effect (p < .005) and a Consequences X Arguments interaction (p < .05).
Overall, high (vs. low) consequences subjects
recalled more arguments (Ms = 2.40 vs.
1.98), and this difference was most pronounced given six persuasive arguments.
Subjects reading trimester (vs. sleep) messages also recalled more arguments (p <
.001).
Analyses were performed on each type of
thought emitted by subjects (M +, M —,

••Subjects' opinions were reassessed between 8 and
15 days after the initial posttest (mean delay =
10.39 days). Analysis of variance on days between
posttest yielded no significant effects. Thus all experimental groups were subjected to approximately
the same delay interval. Also, unless they were
playing the role of "cooperative" subjects to the
hilt, the low rate of suspicion or innocent mention
of their earlier laboratory experience expressed by
subjects during the "telephone opinion survey" suggested that the experiment had been successful in
divorcing the context of the delayed posttest from
the context of the initial opinion posttest.

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

MO, C +, C -, C O ) and also on three derived indices: Message-oriented minus communicator-oriented thoughts (regardless of
valence), positive minus negative thoughts
(regardless of orientation), and total thoughts
expressed. For brevity, only the analyses on
the derived indices are reported. Relatively
more message-oriented than communicatororiented thoughts were expressed by high
(vs. low) consequences subjects (p = .06),
and also by subjects exposed to six (vs. two)
arguments (p < .005) and the likable (vs.
unlikable) communicator (p < .005). A likability effect on positive minus negative
thoughts (p < .001) indicated that the likable
communicator elicited more positive than
negative thoughts, whereas the unlikable communicator elicited more negative thoughts. No
effects obtained on total thoughts expressed.

759

(p < .05), and rated the topic as being more
important (p < .001).
Correlational Analyses

Correlational analyses provided further information regarding the cognitive mediation
of initial opinion change. Correlations between opinion change and perceptions of the
communicator (source ratings, positive and
negative communicator-oriented thoughts)
were generally low and nonsignificant, with
the exception of perceived expertise, which
correlated positively with opinion change
within both low and high consequences conditions (r = .29, p < .005, and r = .25, p <
.05, respectively). As anticipated by the systematic versus heuristic analysis of persuasion, argument recall and both positive and
negative message-oriented thoughts were significantly correlated with initial opinion
Source Perception
change within high consequences conditions
(recall: r = .26, p < .05; M + : r = .41, p <
A factor analysis (varimax rotation) of the
.001; M-: r= -.32, p< .001), but only
source ratings yielded two rotated factors,
negligibly related within low consequences
labeled attractiveness (e.g., warm, likable,
friendly) and expertise (e.g., knowledgable, conditions (recall: r = .06; M+: r = .20,
p < .10; M-: r = -.16, p < .15).
intelligent, competent). These factors acMultiple regression analyses using initial
counted for 55.8% and 10.2% of the vari- •
opinion change as the criterion variable were
ance, respectively. Factor scores were com5
puted for each subject and treated by analy- also performed. Within high consequences
sis of variance. The trustworthy, sincere, and conditions, greater initial opinion change was
predicted primarily by a greater number of
unbiased scales, which loaded highly on
both
positive message-oriented thoughts (p <
neither factor, were analyzed separately.
.05) and positive communicator-oriented
These analyses revealed that the likable (vs.
thoughts (p = .07), fewer negative messageunlikable) communicator was viewed as more
oriented thoughts (p = .10), and greater arattractive, expert, trustworthy, sincere, and
gument recall (p = .11). Within low conseunbiased (ps < .005).
quences conditions, variables that significantly or marginally predicted greater initial
Other Dependent Variables
opinion change included heightened percepHigh (vs. low) consequences subjects spent
more time reading the persuasive message
(p < .005) and reported spending more time
thinking about the communicator's arguments
than his personal characteristics (/><.01).
Subjects exposed to six (vs. two) persuasive
arguments also took longer to read the message (/><.001), spent more time thinking
about the communicator's arguments (p <
.001), expressed a greater desire to be well
informed on the topic (p < .005), reported
exerting greater effort reading the message

5
Two (regular) multiple regression analyses were
performed, one employing data from high consequence subjects (n = 89) and one using data from
low consequences subjects (n = 94). Both analyses
employed the following predictor variables: age,
time spent reading the message, self-reported time
spent thinking about the communicator's argumentation (vs. personal characteristics), attractiveness
factor scores, expertise factor scores, arguments recalled, positive and negative communicator-oriented
thoughts, and positive and negative message-oriented
thoughts.

SHELLY CHAIKEN

760

tions of communicator expertise (p < .05)
and a greater number of positive communicator-oriented thoughts (p — .06).
Experiment 2
A conceptual replication of the first experiment was conducted in order to extend the
generality of the systematic versus heuristic
analysis. This study included only the most
theoretically interesting combinations of the
arguments and likability variables and manipulated issue involvement ("personal relevance") rather than response involvement.
In the 2 x 2 design of Experiment 2, subjects read a message consisting of either five
persuasive arguments from an unlikable communicator or one persuasive argument from a
likable communicator under conditions of
either high or low personal relevance. It was
predicted that subjects in high personal relevance conditions would be more persuaded by
five arguments from an unlikable communicator than by one argument from a likable
communicator. Conversely, low personal
relevance subjects were expected to show
greater opinion change in the one-argument/
likable-communicator condition than in the
five-arguments/unlikable-communicator
condition. Experiment 2 did not examine opinion
persistence and did not include the full set of
dependent measures employed in Experiment 1.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 80 University of Toronto undergraduates enrolled in the author's introductory psychology course who volunteered to remain after
class one evening to participate in an "impression
formation" experiment.
Procedure
Each subject received one of four versions (representing the four experimental conditions) of an experimental booklet. The instructions printed on the
cover page informed subjects that they would record
their impressions of a "target speaker" after first
reading a "partial transcript of an interview with
the target" and a "transcript of a speech made by
the target."
Communicator likability. The first page of the
booklet presented the "interview transcript." The
target speaker (communicator) was portrayed as a

University of Toronto (U of T) administrator who
had previously held a similar position at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Similar to the
device employed in Experiment 1, the communicator's likability or unlikability was conveyed via
his response to the interviewer's question, "By the
way, how do you like U of T compared to UBC?"
In essence, the likable communicator responded by
praising U of T students and faculty and extolling
the virtues of living in Toronto (at the expense of
UBC and Vancouver), whereas the unlikable communicator responded by derogating U of T students
and faculty and the city of Toronto (to the benefit
of UBC and Vancouver).
Personal relevance of message topic. The next
page of the booklet informed subjects that they
would read a transcript of the "target's speech on
the issue of switching from a two-semester to a trimester system at the university." It was stated that
the speech had been presented to a university committee charged with studying the issue. High (vs.
low) personal relevance was manipulated by stating
that, if the Committee approved a switch, the university would adopt the trimester system in the
1981 (vs. 1985) academic year.
Persuasive message. The last page of the booklet contained the persuasive message, whose overall
position stated that "the University of Toronto
should switch from its current two-term system to
a trimester system." Opinion data from an independent group of control subjects (N = 125) indicated that U of T undergraduates disagreed moderately with this position (M = 10.33 on a 15-point
scale on which 15 signified extreme disagreement).
In the message, the communicator first stated his
overall position and, if portrayed earlier as unlikable, provided five arguments supporting this position. If the communicator had been portrayed as
likable, he presented only one supportive argument
(drawn randomly from the pool of five arguments).
Both messages ended with the communicator restating his overall position on the message topic.
Dependent measures. After examining their experimental booklets, subjects were given a one-page
questionnaire. Subjects first wrote down the communicator's overall position (all subjects satisfactorily recalled the position) and then indicated their
agreement with this position by marking a 15-point
scale anchored by strongly disagree and strongly
agree. Next, subjects rated the communicator on the
following 15-point bipolar adjective scales: warmcold, likable-unlikable, friendly-unfriendly, and sincere-insincere. On 15-point scales, subjects next
indicated how personally relevant they considered
the message topic to be, the relative amount of time
they had spent thinking about the communicator's
arguments (vs. personal characteristics), and the
extent to which they typically agreed (disagreed)
with people they liked (disliked). Subjects also indicated their sex and wrote down their interpretations
of the experiment. Three subjects (retained in the
analyses) were assessed as being suspicious of an
influence attempt (two) or the cover story (one).

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

Results
The design included two levels each of subject sex, personal relevance of message topic,
and source-argument pairing (unlikable communicator - five arguments vs. likable communicator-one argument). Since preliminary
analyses revealed no sex differences, subject
sex was ignored in the reported analyses.
Check on Experimental Conditions
Subjects informed that the university
planned to adopt the trimester (if approved)
in 1981 (vs. 1985) judged the trimester issue
to be significantly more personally relevant:
Ms = 5.58 versus 7.42, F(l, 76) = 5.62,
p< .025). No other effects were significant
on this measure. The only significant effect
on subjects' likableness ratings was due to
the source-argument pairing variable, F(l,
76) = 10.11, p < .005: The communicator
who praised (vs. insulted) U of T students
and faculty and complimented (vs. derogated)
Toronto was regarded as more likable (Ms =
5.82 vs. 7.75).
Opinion Change
Opinion change scores (see Table 2) were
formed by subtracting the mean opinion of
the control group from each subject's opinion.
As expected, the Relevance X Source-Argument Pairing interaction proved significant
on these scores, F(l, 76) = 4.30, p < .OS.
Within low personal relevance conditions, significantly greater opinion change occurred
among subjects in the likable-communicator/
one-argument condition than in the unlikablecommunicator/five-arguments condition, F(l,
76) = 4.52, p < .05. Within high relevance
conditions, nonsignificantly greater opinion
change occurred among subjects in the unlikable-communicator/five-arguments (vs. likable/one-argument) condition, F < 1.0. No
other effects were significant on opinion
change.
Other measures. The likable communicator (who presented one argument), compared to the unlikable communicator (who
presented five arguments), was viewed as
more likable (p < .005), warmer (p < .005),

761

Table 2
Mean Opinion Change and Use of the
Liking/Agreement Rule as a Function of
Personal Relevance and Source-Argument
Pairing: Experiment 2
Dependent
variable

Unlikable/
five
arguments

High relevance
Opinion change
3.73
Use of liking/
agreement rule
7.25
Low relevance
Opinion change
2.18
Use of liking/
8.75
agreement rule

Likable/
one
argument

2.78
10.30

4.68
8.95

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater opinion
change and greater use of the liking/agreement rule.
Cell ns = 20.

and friendlier (p < .001), but as less sincere
(p < .05). No other effects were significant
on these ratings.
It had been expected that low relevance
subjects would report greater use of the liking/agreement rule. Although the means were
in the expected direction, the relevance effect
proved nonsignificant (F < 1.0) on subjects'
reports of the extent to which they typically
agreed (disagreed) with people they liked
(disliked)." Analysis of this measure (see
Table 2 for means) did yield a source-argument pairing effect (p<.025), and more
0

Because this item appears to ask for self-reported
use of the liking/agreement heuristic over an extended period of time, it is quite reasonable to argue
that subjects' responses would not necessarily be
affected by their present level of involvement (indeed, the results on this item conformed only partially to predictions). The rationale for including
this item and thinking that it might reflect high
and low involvement subjects' differential use of the
liking/agreement rule is similar to the logic underlying Bern's (1972) self-perception hypothesis. Just
as we might expect a person's presumably stable
self-description of how honest he or she is typically
to be influenced by a recent and salient honest (or
dishonest) behavior on his or her part, it was expected that subjects' self-reports of their typical use
of the liking/agreement heuristic would be influenced
by whether or not they had just employed this rule
in making their opinion judgments.

SHELLY CHAIKEN

762

interestingly, a Relevance X Source-Argument Pairing interaction (p < .05). The first
effect indicates greater reported use of the
liking/agreement rule among subjects in likable-communicator/one-argument (vs. unlikable/five-arguments) conditions. The interaction indicates that among subjects exposed
to five arguments from an unlikable communicator, greater use of the liking/agreement
rule was, as expected, reported by subjects
within low relevance conditions. However,
among subjects receiving only one argument
from a likable communicator, those within
high personal relevance conditions reported
greater use of this heuristic.
No significant effects were obtained on subjects' ratings of the amount of time they had
spent thinking about the communicator's
arguments versus his personal characteristics.
Discussion
The systematic versus heuristic analysis of
persuasion suggests that high levels of response or issue involvement lead message recipients to employ a systematic information
processing strategy in forming their opinion
judgments, whereas low levels of involvement
lead recipients to employ a more economic
heuristic strategy. Based on the assumption
that systematic processing maximizes the persuasive impact of message cues and minimizes the impact of noncontent cues and that
heuristic processing minimizes the persuasive
impact of message cues and maximizes the
impact of noncontent cues, it was hypothesized that the initial opinion judgments of
high involvement subjects would be more
strongly influenced by the amount of argumentation provided in the message than by
the communicator's likability, whereas the
reverse would be true for low involvement
subjects.
The two experiments provided converging
evidence for this hypothesis. In the first
study, high consequences subjects exhibited
significantly greater initial opinion change in
response to messages containing six arguments but were unaffected by the communicator's likability. Conversely, low consequences subjects exhibited significantly greater
opinion change in response to the likable

communicator but were unaffected by the
amount of argumentation provided. In Experiment 2, subjects for whom the message topic
was high in personal relevance showed slightly
greater opinion change when receiving five
arguments from an unlikable communicator
than when receiving one argument from a likable source. In contrast, subjects for whom
the topic was low in personal relevance exhibited significantly greater opinion change
when they received one argument from a likable (vs. five arguments from an unlikable)
communicator.
Analyses on the supplementary measures
included in Experiment 1 yielded additional
support for the assumptions underlying the
major hypothesis. The fact that high consequences subjects expressed a greater desire to
be well informed on the message topic corroborated the assumption that the consequences manipulation would engender differing levels of motivation for in depth information processing. The data were also generally
consistent with the assumption that these
differing motivational sets would lead high
consequences subjects to employ a systematic
processing strategy in which message-based
cognitions would primarily mediate opinion
change and would lead low consequences subjects to employ a heuristic strategy in which
their perceptions of the communicator would
primarily mediate persuasion. High, compared
to low, consequences subjects spent more time
reading the persuasive message, reported
spending more time thinking about the communicator's argumentation (vs. his personal
characteristics), recalled more arguments, and
generated relatively more message-oriented
(vs. communicator-oriented) thoughts. Further, correlational analyses revealed that argument recall, positive
message-oriented
thoughts, and negative message-oriented
thoughts were significantly correlated with and
relatively good predictors of initial opinion
change (ps < .11) for high consequences subjects. In contrast, these variables were negligibly correlated with and poor predictors of
initial opinion change (ps > .28) for low
consequences subjects. Finally, although perceptions of communicator expertise were significantly correlated with opinion change
within both consequences conditions, per-

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

ceived expertise proved to be a significant
predictor of initial opinion change for low
consequences (p < .05), but not high consequences (p > .31), subjects.
Communicator Likability and Opinion Change
Although the opinion data of Experiment 1
were consistent with the suggestion that the
persuasive impact of communicator likability
might reflect recipients' use of a simple
schema such as "people generally agree with
persons they like," the study provided no
direct support for this simple information
processing mechanism. Further, because the
likable communicator was regarded not only
as more attractive but also as more expert,
sincere, trustworthy, and unbiased than his
unlikable counterpart, it is probably unwise
to interpret the impact of the likability manipulation on opinion change and other measures as reflecting the unique effect of communicator likability, unconfounded by other
source dimensions. The fact that subjects' perceptions of communicator expertise related
more strongly to opinion change than their
perceptions of communicator attractiveness
underscores this point. Indeed, the finding
that expertise (and not attractiveness) predicted initial opinion change for low consequences subjects suggests that if, as proposed here, these subjects did employ a simple
decision rule in forming their opinion judgments, it was most likely one based on their
perceptions of the communicator's expertise.
It is important to note that the likability
manipulation of Experiment 1 had little impact on measures presumed to reflect subjects' processing of message content (e.g.,
argument recall, time spent reading the message, time spent thinking about the communicator's argumentation vs. time spent thinking
about his personal characteristics). These
findings are consistent with previous research
(e.g., Norman, 1976; Snyder & Rothbart,
1971) and compatible with a heuristic view
of persuasion: Communicator characteristics
such as likability may often directly affect
recipients' tendencies to accept or reject a
message's overall conclusion without necessarily influencing their processing of persuasive argumentation.

763

To more directly explore recipients' possible
use of a liking/agreement rule, subjects in
Experiment 2 were asked to indicate the
extent to which they typically agreed (disagreed) with people they liked (disliked).
The findings obtained on this measure conformed only partially to predictions. Among
subjects receiving five arguments from an
unlikable communicator, low relevance subjects reported greater use of the liking/agreement rule, as expected. However, among subjects receiving one argument from a likable
communicator, high relevance subjects reported greater use of this heuristic. It is possible that although high relevance subjects in
this condition may have been primarily
oriented toward assessing message content,
they may have considered a message containing only one argument a meager basis for
assessing message validity. Consequently,
these subjects may have felt it necessary to
rely also on information regarding the communicator's likability in forming their opinion judgments. This interpretation, although
tentative, suggests that aside from low levels
of involvement, recipients may rely heavily on
source (or other noncontent) cues in judging
message acceptability when the message's
argumentation provides an insufficient basis
on which to predicate an opinion judgment.
In support of this conjecture, McCroskey
(1969) found that communicator credibility
significantly affected opinion change only
when the persuasive message contained minimal (vs. strong) evidence in support of its
overall conclusion (for an elaborated discussion of factors other than involvement that
may enhance the persuasive impact of source
cues, see Chaiken, 1978).
Persistence oj Opinion Change
As noted previously, Experiment 1 provided adequate support for the assumption
that message-based cognitions would primarily mediate initial opinion change within
high consequences conditions, whereas sourceoriented cognitions would primarily mediate
opinion change within low consequences conditions. This assumption led to the hypothesis
that greater opinion persistence would be
manifested by high consequences subjects.

764

SHELLY CHAIKEN

In accord with this hypothesis, opinion
change remained relatively stable over time
within high consequences conditions but dissipated within low consequences conditions,
although the decrease was significant only for
low consequences subjects exposed to the
likable communicator. The failure to detect a
significant decrement within the low consequences/unlikable communicator condition is
understandable, since initial change in this
cell was not reliably different from zero, presumably because subjects used the communicator's unlikability as a discounting cue.
The present persistence findings and analysis of persuasion are relevant to the sleeper
effect phenomenon. First, the data showed no
hint of a sleeper effect: There was no trend,
within or across consequences conditions, for
agreement with an unlikable communicator to
increase with the passage of time. The traditional "discounting-cue" explanation for the
sleeper effect (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949) holds that over time, the discounting cue (e.g., communicator unlikability) becomes dissociated from the message so
that the persuasive impact of message content
gradually becomes manifest (McGuire, 1969).
Cook and Cruder (Note 1) have suggested
that the sleeper effect is likely to be observed
only if (among other criteria) (a) the message is convincing and has a strong initial
impact on opinions and (b) the discounting
cue significantly inhibits the persuasive impact the message would typically have. An
implicit assumption of their analysis as well
as earlier analyses (Hovland et al., 1949;
McGuire, 1968) is that recipients have adequately processed message content-—otherwise it is unlikely that over time, the persuasive impact of message content could
possibly manifest itself.
The systematic versus heuristic analysis of
persuasion suggests that Cook and Gruder's
(Note 1) two criteria may be met and, consequently, that the sleeper effect may be
observed only when involvement is at some
moderate level. When involvement is high, the
present analysis suggests that the persuasive
impact of potential discounting cues (e.g.,
low levels of credibility, likability) will be
minimal. Thus, unless perhaps a discounting
cue is made salient after recipients have pro-

cessed message content, it is unlikely that
Cook and Gruder's second criterion typically
would be met. Conversely, when involvement
is low, the present analysis suggests that
message content has a minimal impact on
opinions and that recipients generally predicate their opinions on the basis of their reactions to noncontent cues. Given low levels of
involvement, then, it is unlikely that Cook
and Gruder's first criterion would often be
met.
Involvement and Persuasion
Finally, the current research has implications for understanding the impact of involvement on opinion change and opinion
persistence. The fact that involvement exerted no main effect on initial opinion change
in either experiment, as well as some recent
demonstrations that greater involvement
sometimes facilitates persuasion (e.g., Pallak,
Mueller, Dollar, & Pallak, 1972; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979), contradicts earlier theorizing (e.g., Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965;
Triandis, 1971) and research (Miller, 1965;
Sherif & Hovland, 1961) suggesting that
greater involvement typically lowers message
persuasiveness. The systematic versus heuristic analysis, which argues that greater involvement heightens recipients' tendencies to
scrutinize message content, suggests that high
involvement can both facilitate and inhibit
persuasion depending on the quality of persuasive argumentation. Indeed, Petty and
Cacioppo (1979) recently found that involvement heightened persuasion when a message contained strong arguments but inhibited persuasion when the message presented
weak arguments. On the other hand, the finding in Experiment 1 that high consequences
subjects showed relatively greater opinion
stability suggests, in accord with previous
correlational evidence (Watts, 1967), that
opinion change induced under high involvement conditions results in greater persistence.
This greater persistence presumably occurs
because high involvement fosters in depth
processing of message content, which leads
recipients to possess more topic-relevant cognitive supports for their adopted opinions.

SOURCE VERSUS MESSAGE CUES

Summary and Conclusions
The present research generally supports the
distinction made between a systematic view of
persuasion, with its emphasis on detailed
information processing and the mediational
role of content-based cognitions, and a heuristic view of persuasion, with its focus on the
role of simple rules or cognitive heuristics in
mediating opinion change. Admittedly, the
research was more successful in documenting
the cognitive mediation of opinion change
specified by a systematic view of persuasion
than it was in documenting the cognitive
mediation specified by a heuristic conceptualization. Yet the overall pattern of findings
supports the utility of the latter conceptualization and suggests that it may be worthwhile for persuasion researchers to further
explore the conditions under which recipients
may engage in heuristic information processing and to explore more systematically the
kinds of simple information processing mechanisms that may often underlie persuasion
effects.
The research also provides some support for
the hypothesis that content-mediated opinion
change should persist longer than sourcemediated persuasion. Finally, the relevance
of the systematic versus heuristic analysis of
persuasion to the sleeper effect phenomenon
and the role of involvement in persuasion are
discussed. With regard to the former, it is
suggested that the preconditions thought necessary for obtaining the sleeper effect (Cook
& Cruder, Note 1) may not often occur when
involvement levels are set very high or low.
With respect to involvement itself, it is argued that although heightened involvement
can both facilitate and inhibit the immediate
impact of a persuasive message, change induced under conditions of high (vs. low) involvement should show greater persistence.
Reference Note
1. Cook, T. D., & Cruder, C. L. The sleeper effect
predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis: A
living phenomenon. Unpublished manuscript,
Northwestern University, 1979.

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</reference>

<statements>
1. high involvement can promote systematic processing
2. The heuristic-systematic model supplies the general cue-reliance mechanism: under low involvement or low accuracy motivation, recipients rely on noncontent cues such as communicator credibility or perceived audience opinion rather than argument quality, and source-mediated opinion change is less persistent than content-mediated change
3. This is the theoretical route by which closure might increase acceptance of misinformation when a trusted source, consensus, or familiar framing is salient, although Chaiken’s experiment manipulated involvement rather than NFC
4. Chaiken’s model similarly predicts that when recipients are highly involved and reliability concerns are paramount, they process message content systematically rather than relying on source cues
</statements>

Begin the assessment now. Output only the JSON list, without any conversational text or explanations.