You will be provided with a reference and some statements. Please determine whether each statement is 'supported', 'unsupported', or 'unknown' with respect to the reference. Please note:
First, assess whether the reference contains any valid content. If the reference contains no valid information, such as a 'page not found' message, then all statements should be considered 'unknown'.
If the reference is valid, for a given statement: if the facts or data it contains can be found entirely or partially within the reference, it is considered 'supported' (data accepts rounding); if all facts and data in the statement cannot be found in the reference, it is considered 'unsupported'.

You should return the result in a JSON list format, where each item in the list contains the statement's index and the judgment result, for example:
[
    {
        "idx": 1,
        "result": "supported"
    },
    {
        "idx": 2,
        "result": "unsupported"
    }
]

Below are the reference and statements:
<reference>
Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style



MENU

Add publications and datasets

Lists

Sign in

Academic Bibliography

Search 200 years of publications by Ghent University researchers.

Search publications and datasets

Advanced search

1 file | 596.36 KB

Download

Download "Individual differences - (...).pdf"

See all downloads

Add to list

Search results

Investigating the robustness of the i...

Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style

Jonas De keersmaecker

(
UGent
)

,
David Dunning
,
Gordon Pennycook
,
David G. Rand
,
Carmen Sanchez
,
Christian Unkelbach
and

Arne Roets

(
UGent
)

(
2020
)

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
.

46
(2)
.

p.204-215

Author

Jonas De keersmaecker

(
UGent
)

,
David Dunning
,
Gordon Pennycook
,
David G. Rand
,
Carmen Sanchez
,
Christian Unkelbach
and

Arne Roets

(
UGent
)

Organization

Department of developmental, personality and social psychology

Abstract

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

Keywords

Social Psychology
,
illusory truth effect
,
analytic thinking
,
intuition
,
cognitive ability
,
need for cognitive closure
,
reasoning
,
FLUENCY
,
INFORMATION
,
REFLECTION
,
JUDGMENTS
,
VALIDATION
,
FREQUENCY
,
STATEMENT
,
KNOWLEDGE
,
FORM

Downloads

Download

Individual differences - illusory truth effect. Accepted version.pdf

full text

(Accepted manuscript)

|

open access

|

PDF

|

596.36 KB

Citation

Cite this

BibTeX

Metrics

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8653558

MLA

De keersmaecker, Jonas, et al. “Investigating the Robustness of the IIlusory Truth Effect across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style.”
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
, vol. 46, no. 2, 2020, pp. 204–15, doi:10.1177/0146167219853844.

APA

De keersmaecker, J., Dunning, D., Pennycook, G., Rand, D. G., Sanchez, C., Unkelbach, C., & Roets, A. (2020). Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
,
46
(2), 204–215. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219853844

Chicago author-date

De keersmaecker, Jonas, David Dunning, Gordon Pennycook, David G. Rand, Carmen Sanchez, Christian Unkelbach, and Arne Roets. 2020. “Investigating the Robustness of the IIlusory Truth Effect across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style.”
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
46 (2): 204–15. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219853844.

Chicago author-date (all authors)

De keersmaecker, Jonas, David Dunning, Gordon Pennycook, David G. Rand, Carmen Sanchez, Christian Unkelbach, and Arne Roets. 2020. “Investigating the Robustness of the IIlusory Truth Effect across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style.”
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
46 (2): 204–215. doi:10.1177/0146167219853844.

Vancouver

1.
De keersmaecker J, Dunning D, Pennycook G, Rand DG, Sanchez C, Unkelbach C, et al. Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN. 2020;46(2):204–15.

IEEE

[1]
J. De keersmaecker
et al.
, “Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style,”
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 204–215, 2020.

@article{8653558,
abstract = {{People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.}},
author = {{De keersmaecker, Jonas and Dunning, David and Pennycook, Gordon and Rand, David G. and Sanchez, Carmen and Unkelbach, Christian and Roets, Arne}},
issn = {{0146-1672}},
journal = {{PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN}},
keywords = {{Social Psychology,illusory truth effect,analytic thinking,intuition,cognitive ability,need for cognitive closure,reasoning,FLUENCY,INFORMATION,REFLECTION,JUDGMENTS,VALIDATION,FREQUENCY,STATEMENT,KNOWLEDGE,FORM}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{204--215}},
title = {{Investigating the robustness of the iIlusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style}},
url = {{http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219853844}},
volume = {{46}},
year = {{2020}},
}

Altmetric

View in Altmetric

Web of Science

Times cited:

Subject

Social Sciences

Year

2020

Publication type

Journal Article
(Original Article)

Publication status

published

Journal title

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.

ISSN

0146-1672

1552-7433

Volume

46

Issue

2

Pages

204 - 215

DOI

10.1177/0146167219853844

Language

English

UGent publication?

yes

UGent classification

A1

Web of Science type

Article

Web of Science id

000504186000003

JCR category

PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL

JCR impact factor

4.376 (2020)

JCR rank

11/65 (2020)

Copyright statement

No license (in copyright)

id

8653558

Handle

http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8653558

Date created

2020-03-13 08:59:37

Date last changed

2026-09-03 07:02:32

Contents

Publications

Datasets

Authors

Organizations

Projects

Support

FAQ

Open Access

Support and trainings

Download & API

Contact

Do you have any questions regarding the use of the Academic Bibliography?

Contact us

Developed by
Ghent University Library
.
</reference>

<statements>
1. For misinformation acceptance—here spanning conspiracy narratives, fake-news headlines, post-event eyewitness misinformation, and repetition-based truth judgments
2. the evidence supports a conditional, modest role rather than a stable main effect
3. Repetition-driven acceptance appears largely closure-independent: across seven studies, the illusory truth effect was robust to need for cognitive closure
4. The empirical pattern is not a simple positive NFC–misinformation relationship
5. Taken together, these studies do not establish a robust positive main effect of NFC on misinformation acceptance
6. They establish a conditional effect: it may be small or null when trust, ideology, repetition, or latent-profile differences dominate
7. The illusory truth effect was robust to cognitive ability and closure across seven studies
8. Therefore, a closure-based account cannot explain why repeated false statements feel true
9. The direct tests are heterogeneous across domains
10. it has little role in repetition-driven truthiness
11. fluency-based acceptance is closure-independent
12. A decisive next step would be a closure-specific meta-analysis and experiments that jointly manipulate accessibility of official explanations, accountability, institutional trust, message repetition, and threat while measuring NFC with validated scales
</statements>

Begin the assessment now. Output only the JSON list, without any conversational text or explanations.